Background on Information Disclosure

Given the prevalence of information problems in healthcare and health insurance, it seems natural to ask how the disclosure of more information might change the behavior of patients and providers. Module 4 covers this issue. We’ll spend today discussing some of the relevant policy issues related to disclosure, in particular the publication of health insurance plan information, hospital and physician quality information, and hospital price information.

For an excellent background on quality disclosure, please see Dranove and Jin (2010). There’s also a literature on the unintended consequences of price disclosure where price disclosure might actually increase prices. See Albæk, Møllgaard, and Overgaard (1997) and more recently Luco (2019) as some examples of that research.

References

Albæk, Svend, Peter Møllgaard, and Per B. Overgaard. 1997. “Government-Assisted Oligopoly Coordination? A Concrete Case.” The Journal of Industrial Economics 45 (4): 429–43. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6451.00057.
Dranove, David, and Ginger Zhe Jin. 2010. “Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice.” Journal of Economic Literature 48 (4): 935–63.
Luco, Fernando. 2019. “Who Benefits from Information Disclosure? The Case of Retail Gasoline.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 11 (2): 277–305. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20170110.